














































































































No more compulsory engagement 
The emancipation of German security policy
Justyna Gotkowska
Germany’s stance on Libya at the UN Security Council and its later decision 
not to take part in the military intervention gave rise to heated controversy 
both in Germany and abroad. At home, this was criticised as “an enormous 
mistake of historic impact”1; while abroad this raised questions about Ger-
many’s willingness to co-operate with its key Western allies. With its deci-
sion on Libya, Germany sealed the process of making its security policy 
independent from the stances of the US and France. It thus ceased to feel 
any compulsion to provide not only military engagement but also political 
support for overseas operations initiated by its key allies, even if these 
are legitimised by the UN Security Council. Germany’s stance, apart from 
finishing off a certain process, is also setting a starting point for a discus-
sion inside Germany about its military engagement in international security 
policy. This will bring about a more assertive and selective approach to co-
operation with NATO and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. 
Multilateralism in German security policy
Until	1994,	Germany	had	perceived	itself	exclusively	as	a	‘civilian	power’	(Zivilmacht)	and	












than	 forty	years,	 the	allies	began	to	expect	 that	 the	reunified	Germany	would	 fully	engage	
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and	military	 contribution	 to	 overseas	 operations	 the	US	 and	 France	 called	 for	 and	 led.	
The	reasons	for	this	approach	were	historical	and	also	due	to	the	belief	that	it	was	neces-
sary	to	build	trust	 in	relations	with	its	allies	and	partners	who	could	feel	endangered	by	










tion	 that	what	was	good	 for	 the	EU	and	
NATO	was	in	line	with	German	interests.	
This	doctrine	became	a	‘mantra’	for	sub-














































Since the Constitutional Court’s break-
through decision, German security 
policy has been shaped by the principle 
of what German analysts call the multi-
lateralism doctrine . It ruled out inde-
pendent decisions being taken within 
NATO and the EU contrary to the policy 
of the US or France.
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A revision of the German security policy
A	gradual	withdrawal	 from	 the	doctrine	 of	multilateralism	and	 compulsory	 engagement,	
first	 in	 relations	with	 the	US,	 then	within	NATO,	and	 later	with	 regard	 to	France	within	
the	EU,	has	been	observed	since	Gerhard	Schröder’s	government.	The	most	recent	event	
in	 this	 process	was	 the	German	 stance	 on	 resolution1973	 concerning	 Libya	 at	 the	UN	



















the	 reunification	 of	 Germany.	 Germany’s	
security	 was	 no	 longer	 unconditionally	















































A gradual withdrawal from the doc-
trine of multilateralism and compulso-
ry engagement, first in relations with 
the US, then within NATO, and later 
with regard to France within the EU, 
has been observed since Gerhard 
Schröder’s government. 













































Possible scenarios of the development 
of German policy in NATO and the EU
The	German	stance	on	Libya	is	also	setting	a	starting	point	for	the	development	of	a	new	
German	approach	to	security	policy,	which	will	affect	a	further	development	of	NATO	and	



































The German stance on Libya can be 
seen as a symbolic act finishing off 
the process of Germany becoming 
independent from the USA and France 
in international security policy. 
























































































NATO’s	 tasks	 to	 ensure	 energy	 security	 or	 cyber	 security12.	 The	German	 reactions	 after	
The German stance on Libya is also 
setting a starting point for the develop-
ment of a new German approach to 
security policy, which will affect a fur-
ther development of NATO and the EU. 
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13	 Valentina	Pop,	US	Defence	
chief:	‘Europe	may	no	longer	be	
worth	defending’,	euobserver,	
10	June	2011,	
http://euobserver.com/?a-
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14	 The	most	recent	German	acti-
vities	in	the	EU	(the	German-
Swedish	Ghent	Initiative)	for	
enhancing	military	co-opera-
tion,	propagated	as	a	revival	
of	the	Common	Security	and	
Defence	Policy,	are	interpreted	
in	France	and	the	United	King-
dom	and	also	in	Germany	itself	
as	insubstantial	and	limited	to	
declarations	to	a	great	extent.	
15	 ‘Bericht	des	Generalinspek-
teurs	der	Bundeswehr	zum	
Prüfauftrag	aus	der	Kabinet-
tsklausur	vom	7.	Juni	2010’	
page	17,	www.bmvg.de
the	statement	by	the	US	Secretary	of	Defence,	Robert	Gates	can	be	seen	as	an	indicator	
of	the	German	stance	on	the	future	of	NATO.	Gates	said	that	if	the	European	allies	did	not	
start	investing	in	military	capacity	and	being	engaged	in	NATO’s	foreign	missions,	the	US	
may	not	be	willing	to	invest	further	in	NATO	and	European	security	in	the	future13.	Gates’s	
speech,	which	was	widely	commented	on	in	Europe,	did	not	lead	to	any	major	discussion	on	
the	future	of	NATO	in	Germany.	In	the	case	of	the	EU,	the	Libya	issue	convinced	Germany	
that	there	are	situations	when	it	is	difficult	to	reconcile	the	interests	and	approach	of	France	
with	security	policy	and	the	approach	of	Germany,	as	well	as	to	develop	EU	instruments	
as	part	of	the	common	security	policy.	Therefore,	Germany	will	still	not	wish	to	participate	
in	a	stronger	integration	of	the	armed	forces	within	the	EU,	despite	sticking	to	pro-European	
rhetoric	regarding	building	closer	military	co-operation14.	Germany	will	reject	solutions	which	
could	make	it	dependent	on	its	allies,	increase	the	political	pressure	on	Germany	to	carry	
out	certain	operations	or	block	actions	of	the	Bundeswehr15.	Germany	will	remain	scepti-
cal	about	the	operational	use	of	battle	groups.	Berlin	envisages	participation	in	enhancing	
co-operation	in	the	areas	of	training,	logistics	and	command	structures.	As	part	of	enhanc-
ing	European	co-operation,	Germany	will	still	be	interested	in	developing	the	civil	dimension	
of	the	EU’s	security	policy	as	well	as	supporting	and	promoting	the	German	arms	industry	
in	the	process	of	the	creation	of	the	‘European	technological	and	industrial	base.’
